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Abstract: In debates of climate action, low carbon development has been widely 
advocated as an opportunity arising from climate change.  This paper 
problematises low carbon development, arguing that there are undesirable, 
unintended or perverse effects that give rise to distinct and serious security 
concerns.  The literature on climate security has addressed the effects of climate 
threats on conflict but there is a notable paucity of research analysing the 
security implications of responses to climate change in the form of low carbon 
development.  The paper presents critical analysis of the ways low carbon 
development yields new security concerns as well as entrenching existing ones.  
Five dimensions of security are examined: spatially uneven effects of low carbon 
development; violent imaginaries of the global south and the production of 
‘ungoverned spaces’; non-violent yet harmful instances of conflict; 
marginalisation and dispossession; depoliticised, techno-managerial effects of 
resilience.  The paper shows that climate (in)security manifests in variegated 
ways between different populations and spatial scales.  Consequently, how, when 
for whom low carbon development becomes a threat or opportunity is socially 
constructed and deeply political.  
 
 
Keywords: adaptation, climate security, conflict, fragility, imaginary, low carbon 
development, mitigation, power, resilience 
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1. Introduction 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and 
the Paris Agreement crystallise the global significance, ambition and 
requirements to deal with climate change. The UN Secretary-General, António 
Guterres, urgently called for action to deal with climate change in 2017 as it is 
“an unprecedented and growing threat — to peace and prosperity” but also “a 
massive opportunity that we cannot afford to miss” (Guterres, 2017).  As this 
statement demonstrates, on one hand, climate change is often discussed as the 
‘threat multiplier’ that can lead to conflicts and instability (CNA, 2007).  On the 
other hand, opportunities of dealing with climate change are taking shape in the 
form of low carbon development, combining mitigation and adaptation 
strategies.  With governments committing to Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions (INDCs), calls have been made for a “ ‘decisive transition’ towards 
low carbon economies” spurred by international collective action (OECD, 
2017:19). 
 
Studies on climate security, and more broadly on environmental security, 
demonstrate numerous effects of changing environments.  These studies provide 
diverging explanations on causal relations between environment and 
conflict/insecurity, characterised by a broad spectrum of approaches (Salehyan, 
2008, 2014).  However, there is a notable paucity of research analysing the 
security implications of the various responses to climate change, particularly in 
the form of low carbon development.  This lack of attention is problematic when 
development paradigms have no choice but to face climate change and its 
impacts (Boyd et al. , 2009).   After all in an anthropocene era, “what kind of 
nature gets produced is now the political question of our times” (Dalby, 2013a: 
185).  Therefore, there is a need to better understand climate security not only as 
a result of climate change but also as a result of mitigating and adapting to it. 
What are the security implications of low carbon development?  Are they simply 
opportunities not to be missed without any dangers or risks? The purpose of this 
paper is not to discredit or deny low carbon development efforts, since we 
acknowledge their critical importance in dealing with climate change in many 
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parts of the world; but to question how, when, for whom low carbon 
development matters and the security implications it brings about.  
 
The paper presents critical analysis of the ways low carbon development yields 
new security concerns as well as entrench existing concerns with problematic 
effects.   Low carbon development can throw up inadvertent and undesirable 
effects-- and even intentional perverse ones-- on local communities and their 
livelihoods, ecosystems, the state and its stability.  This study contributes to an 
emerging body of work on the interface of maladaptation and security (Adger et 
al., 2014; Haldén, 2007; Swatuk et al., 2018; Tänzler et al., 2013).  The paper 
demonstrates how mitigation or adaptation efforts can produce and perpetuate 
spaces of danger, crudely dividing problems and solutions into those of the 
global north and south.  In addition, such spaces tend to be regions and parts of 
society where burdens of reacting to and preventing climate change are 
experienced the most by marginalised groups - often through coercive means.  
The paper advances analytical development of climate security to incorporate 
these unanticipated or perverse effects as a result of addressing climate change.  
The significance of such advancement is that it allows further exploration of the 
political framing of climate change.   
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  The next section defines low 
carbon development and identifies the critiques regarding its effects on social 
tensions and inequalities.  These implications are related to the literature on 
climate security, which focuses on conflict and violence associated with climate 
change.  The paper then presents five key dimensions of security for a critical 
examination of low carbon development and its implications: the spatially 
uneven effects of low carbon development (Section 3);  violent imaginaries of the 
global south and the production of ‘ungoverned spaces’, demarcating spaces of 
insecurity (Hartmann, 2010) (Section 4); non-violent yet harmful instances of 
conflict, mediated through political control (Section 5); marginalisation and 
dispossession of groups within society (Section 6); and depoliticised, techno-
managerial effects of resilience that evade addressing sources of contention 
(Section 7). Based on these arguments, section eight suggests productive 
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avenues to further climate security research.  The paper concludes with the 
significance of low carbon development for climate security scholarship in light 
of global and national policies for climate change.   
 
2. Problematising low carbon development  
Low carbon development covers a range of economic growth approaches and 
carbon reduction strategies (Mulugetta and Urban, 2010; Urban, 2010). While 
there is no unified definition, reducing emissions or maintaining low levels is one 
of the key objectives while simultaneously seeking growth.  This entails 
processes that: 1) change carbon production for more efficiency; 2) replace 
carbon with other sources; 3) refocus growth on different economic sectors and 
bring about structural changes in economy; 4) influence consumption through 
behavioural and lifestyle changes (Urban 2010). Definitions of low carbon 
development often tend to focus on developed countries and their possibilities 
for mitigation only.  However, low carbon development may offer opportunities 
for developing countries as well, increasing access to alternative energy sources 
and avoiding high costs of a carbon-intensive economy amongst others (Urban, 
2010).  Adaptation is also part of low carbon development especially if 
understood not simply as technical responses to consequences of climate change, 
but as socio-political transformation with redistributional effects (Tänzler et al., 
2010).   Adaptation that is coordinated and governed across different actors can 
address views of vulnerable groups within society and provide distributive 
justice (Huitema et al., 2016).  The United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), which initially set out ideas on low carbon 
development, specify “forward-looking, climate-friendly growth strategies that 
can highlight a country’s priority actions for climate mitigation and adaptation, 
and a country’s role in the global effort against climate change [emphasis 
added]” (Clapp et al., 2010: 11).  
 
In least developed country contexts, low carbon development can be particularly 
effective in areas of land-use change including agriculture and deforestation 
practices.  In addition to land-use, electrification is considered another area 
where low carbon approaches can be applied at low cost (Bowen and 
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Fankhauser, 2011).  Mainstreaming adaptation to development has been argued 
for more effectiveness, indicating that adaptation and development are 
interlinked (Ayers et al., 2014).  However, these interventions are not necessarily 
without trade-offs.  Mitigation and adaptation efforts may rely on land 
investments or large-scale infrastructure development that alter access to 
natural resources, giving rise to conflict if property rights or institutional 
mechanisms are not robust enough (Adger et al., 2014).  It has been cautioned 
that low carbon development does not guarantee poverty reduction effects; in 
fact there could be no benefits to the poor and incur negative impacts to 
differentiated groups within society (Funder et al., 2009).    
 
Indeed, existing studies on adaptation demonstrate growing evidence that 
maladaptation may further exacerbate existing tensions and inequalities 
between different parts of society (Adger et al., 2014; Eriksen et al., 2011; 
Magnan et al., 2016).  These maladaptations highlight further vulnerabilities, 
often across a range of dimensions.  They are not only environmental or socio-
economic vulnerabilities but also extend to political, cultural or institutional 
dimensions.  Moreover, maladaptation may affect those beyond the immediate 
locale of low carbon initiatives and have uncertain temporal manifestations into 
the future (Magnan et al., 2016).  Attempts to avoid maladaptation itself could 
have consequences such that they could be ‘adding insult to injury’, leaving those 
vulnerable further exposed to harms (Marino and Ribot, 2012).  The concept of 
divergent adaptation by Snorek et al. (2014) also points to new risks when 
adaptive capacity differs between groups in society.  In their study of responses 
to climate vulnerability in Niger between pastoral and agricultural groups, they 
found that the adaptive capacity of one social group could be contingent on 
another.  This leads to a situation where those with weakened adaptive capacity 
end up resorting to violence.  Thus, adaptation can in fact, “bring about unequal 
access to entitlements, institutions and resources; change social networks; limit 
one’s option to response to climatic hazards” (Snorek et al., 2014: 384).  
 
However, the security implication of low carbon development has been hardly 
discussed.   Climate security has generated multiple discourses, for example, on 
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dangers to the state and to individuals that are immediate and presenting 
existential threats.  Other discourses are on risks that are diffuse and with 
impacts likely to manifest in the future.  Climate security also involves discourses 
on resilience to external shocks (Dietz et al., 2016; Corry, 2012).  While there is 
no agreed definition of climate security, it can be understood as,  “a condition 
where people, communities, and states have the capacity to manage stresses 
emerging from climate change and variability” (Dellmuth et al., 2018: 3).  It 
covers a very broad spectrum of policy areas from traditional security, 
diplomacy, peace and conflict, development, disaster risk reduction and refugees 
(Dellmuth et al., 2018), many of which are relevant for low carbon development 
initiatives.  If reviewing low carbon development as an active strategy or an 
opportunity to pursue against the impacts of climate change, then climate 
security studies need to look beyond  risks simply associated with events of 
drought, flooding or temperature rise.    
 
The discourse of climate security is vital in shaping “who is in need of protection 
from the threat posed by climate change; who is capable of providing this 
protection; and (crucially) what forms responses to these threats might take” 
(McDonald, 2013: 49).  By extending these questions to inadvertent, perverse, 
undesirable effects of low carbon development, it is possible to further deepen 
our understanding of measures of prevention or response.    
 
The notion of security is relative and multiple discourses exist, highlighting 
multiple referent objects: the nation-state; people; international society; 
biosphere (McDonald, 2013; Gemenne et al., 2014).  Studies hitherto have 
attempted to explain how climate change is associated with conflict, in particular 
violent conflict such as food (in)security correlated to riots and protests (Natalini 
et al., 2015; Kelley et al., 2015; Jones et al., 2017; Fjelde, 2015) or increased 
water insecurity as a conflict driver between and within states (UNEP, 2011; 
Homer-Dixon, 1999).  Other studies examine when temperature or precipitation 
gives rise to increased incidence of communal conflict or interpersonal violence 
(e.g. Hsiang and Burke, 2014; Hsiang et al., 2013; Anderson and DeLisi, 2015; 
Hendrix and Saleyhan, 2012).    Alternatively, studies have focused on 
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vulnerabilities of individuals and communities to better understand for whom 
climate change matters, often through increased burdens and erosion of 
vulnerabilities.  These studies argue that climate risks are embedded in a range 
of factors such as ethnicity, class, gender, age, and associated political economy 
factors.  Combined, they shape inequalities of resource access, opportunities for 
response, alternative livelihoods options and influence decision-making (IPCC, 
2012; IPCC, 2014; Kurtz and McMahon, 2015; Adano et al., 2012; UNEP, 2011; 
Blaikie et al., 2004; Vivekanada, 2011; Goulden and Few, 2011; Raleigh, 2010; 
Okpara et al., 2015; Weir and Virani 2011).  While this is not the place for a 
systematic review of climate security and by extension the environmental 
security literature (instead see recent reviews such as Adger et al. ,2014; 
Brzoska, 2018; Forsyth and Schomerus, 2013; Gemenne et al., 2014; Ide and 
Scheffran, 2014; Lewis and Lenton, 2015),  it is important to address the notable 
gap in analysing unintended or unforeseen implications of dealing with climate 
change.  
 
There is nascent consideration of security implications for example by  
Haldén (2007: 107) who highlighted a “double boomerang effect” where action 
intended without harm such as an adaptation strategy may generate risk.  
Addressing this risk further creates other kinds of risk such that states would 
end up “binding themselves to the recursive nature of risk-generation” (ibid: 
108).  He contends that dealing with climate change, such as the militarisation of 
the Arctic territories, may throw up further risks of international conflict. 
Similarly, it has been suggested by Swatuk et al. (2018) that there are 
‘boomerang effects’ where adaptation and mitigation bring about unexpected, 
perverse effects on communities through social, political, economic and 
ecological impacts, which then ends up “manifesting as threats to economic 
stability, state authority and/or ecological sustainability” (ibid: 5).  They argued 
that the boomerang effect could destabilise the state in which mitigation or 
adaptation was taken or be transboundary, affecting another state.     
 
These studies usefully highlight the temporal and spatial dimension of climate 
security.   Furthermore, the study by Swatuk et al. (2018) points out that the 
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state is often the harbinger of insecurity itself when local level impacts, while 
unintended, are often deemed tolerable by the state, thereby passing on the 
burdens to local communities.1  Nevertheless, these studies do not account for all 
security aspects of low carbon development and do not provide a full picture of 
those most needing protection from stresses and threats. Studies need to analyse 
the socio-economic, political and institutional conditions that underlie the 
perverse repetition of risks.         
 
Policy debates have drawn attention to the need for more conflict sensitive 
adaptation to avoid the ‘backdraft’ of security risks, including violence and social 
and political contentions (Tänzler et al., 2013).  More recently, the 2015 report, 
‘A New Climate for Peace’, commissioned by the G7 governments noted that the 
unintended impacts of implementing climate policies required further attention 
(Rüttinger et al., 2015).  While there is certainly a need to refocus attention to 
these knock-on risks and implications, it is crucial to redress underlying notions 
of violence and fragility—as we demonstrate later in section 4.  If experiences of 
vulnerabilities are different across society, then analytical perspectives of those 
situated in developing contexts as well as from a cross-section of society is 
further needed to flesh out security concerns.  There is a need to parse out how 
contentions emerge and better identify their security dimensions. 
 
3. Uneven low carbon development  
The unintended effects of low carbon development relate to the uneven effects of 
mitigation or adaptation measures.  Low carbon development has been criticised 
for being typically couched in a narrow economic narrative excluding non-
economic indicators, such as well-being.  This renders the discussion on bridging 
development and climate action depoliticised and technocratic (Ficklin et al., 
2018).   Low carbon development initiatives are at the risk of implementing 
adaptive measures that “effectively [treat] climate change as an externality”, 
forgoing discussion on ecological factors and environmental dynamics (Brooks et 
al., 2009: 752).  Climate mitigation efforts have also been challenged as being 
blinkered by patriarchal assumptions, utilising a masculine perspective 
particularly around inclusion/exclusion of participation and decision-making 
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(Boyd, 2002).  The materialities of the resource itself used for low carbon 
development can also produce differences in how local communities and 
individuals benefit more than others.  For example, small-scale hydropower 
projects under the clean development mechanism in Honduras enabled more 
development benefits to accrue in communities close to the project sites or to 
those that were able to provide reforestation areas.  The context in which 
benefits are negotiated is highly localised and can intensify conflict over 
resources access (Newell and Bumpus, 2012).   A broader perspective on the 
differentiated processes and outcomes of low carbon development assists 
understanding on how, when and for whom climate security matters. 
 
Moving away from a carbon-based energy system generates geographical 
difference through alternative energy systems and the structures that support 
them.  In her study of renewable energy transitions in South Africa, McEwan 
(2017) found that new territories were created where public and private actors 
could establish power and authority and extend infrastructure systems, often 
resulting in skewed access and allocation of benefits.  Spatial differentiation 
gives rise to uneven development (Bridge et al., 2013).   This is exemplified with 
climate engineering that alter precipitation patterns.2  The trans-regional effects 
of climate engineering open up competition for strategic investments and 
potential conflict dynamics.  Furthermore, producing a specific regional climate 
has political implications: investments in climate engineering could be a way to 
advance political influence by managing and altering trans-regional effects (Maas 
and Scheffran et al., 2012).   
 
Uneven effects are bound up in the working of power so that insecurities 
manifest not only at international or national levels but also between and within 
communities.  In their study of 11 case studies in the Middle East, the Sahel and 
the Mediterranean, Zografos et al. (2014) argued that interventions to provide 
certain aspects of security come at the expense of reduced human security due to 
unequal power relations between different societal groups .  They underscored 
“the micro-politics of human security, i.e. the heterogeneous practices, thoughts, 
and the routines in which various persons and groups engage” for a nuanced 
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understanding of the political and economic dimensions of insecurity (Zografos 
et al., 2014: 332).   Similarly, in assessing the difference of climate change 
vulnerabilities at the sub-community level in Bangladesh, Coirolo and Rahman 
(2014) identified that vulnerability is buffered by power exercised through 
networking with people of influence or by enforcing rights to resources for 
protection or expansion of livelihood options.   
 
Low carbon development raises questions regarding the assumptions of the 
security-development nexus.  This nexus ties together poverty, 
underdevelopment and insecurity.  Moreover it is predicated on a notion that 
there can and ought to be a linear transition of development giving rise to 
security. The notion of security in the face of changing climate in developing 
countries may reinforce a supposed ‘normal’ progress, rejecting “deviation from 
the ideal typical imagination of what a successful nation state ought to be” (Shah, 
2014: 132).  Problematically, this process could merely be a reproduction of the 
insecurities it is aiming to combat (Shah, 2014; 2009).  It is important to point 
out that the assumption of growth based on a neo-liberal agenda is not limited to 
developing country contexts and can be seen in examples of adapting to natural 
disaster in industrialised economies.  In their case study of landslide disaster in 
south-west Italy, D’Alisa and Kallis (2016) analysed the way costly infrastructure 
was built in the name of adaptation only to enable citizens to continue living in a 
disaster prone area and for state investment to accrue.  They argued that 
disaster capitalism, or the process of capital accumulation in the wake of a 
disaster, can occur through the consensus between state and civil society for 
options that would seek economic growth. 
 
Grove (2010) makes a pertinent point about climate risk incorporated into 
development as something that goes beyond mere economic instruments and 
works as an apparatus of biopolitics and geopolitics proffering the global north.  
The effects of development agendas led by the UN and World Bank, which have 
taken up risk management and catastrophe insurance, have significant political 
effects that render life as an object of security.  The implication of this 
biopolitical approach is that risk management or insurance is no longer “benign” 
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means of climate security (Grove, 2010: 541).  Instead, they are used to 
“profitably manage a risky and emergent transactional economy between a 
disjointed ‘subject’ and its surroundings” (ibid: 546).   Similarly, adaptation 
strategies can also target “those yet-to-be-made governable under the global 
neoliberal order”, thereby justifying coercive measures to discipline and shape 
these supposed dangerous populations (Bettini, 2014: 187).  Biopolitics of 
climate change work in tandem with the geopolitics that sever the global north 
from the ‘undeveloped’ global south. 
 
4. Violent imaginaries and ‘ungoverned spaces’   
The severing of the global south from the north due to the dangers they pose is 
buttressed by discourses securitising climate change.   The climate security 
discourse that foregrounds existential threats presents an alarmist portrayal of a 
violent world in need of urgent action to prevent future crisis (Stripple, 2017).   
Despite scholarship making it clear that “research to date has failed to converge 
on a specific and direct association between climate and violent conflict” 
(Buhaug et al., 2014: 4), governments of Australia, UK, Germany, France, India 
and China have placed, or have considered placing, climate change within the 
purview of the military (Gilbert, 2012).  In particular, the US Department of 
Defense and intelligence community have investigated scenarios of climate 
change impacts since 2003 (Hartmann, 2010) and position climate change as a 
matter of national security (see Quadrennial Defense Review of the Department 
of Defense, 2010; 2014; CNA, 2007; CAN Military Advisory Board, 2014;Fingar, 
2008; White House, 2015).  When the security of the state is at stake, not only is 
it about abating climate-related crises but also the ways migration or terrorism 
get bound up in concerns of climate-induced conflict.  Military intervention and 
spending on conflicts arising from climate change is conveniently justified 
(Brzoska, 2009; Gilbert, 2012).  From this perspective, vulnerable, fragile or 
failed states abroad become a particular concern.   
 
The urgency, then, is to identify factors that could threaten the current 
geopolitical order, or more specifically, the industrialised states (Diez et al., 
2016).  A stark distinction is made between the industrialised countries and the 
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periphery subject to them within a system of ‘carboniferous capitalism’ (Dalby, 
2013a). The military sector that invokes climate security focuses on seeking 
immediate adaptive measures, rather than long-term plans of mitigation (Diez et 
al., 2016). Subsequently, development assistance and humanitarian aid become 
tightly intertwined with providing stability in fragile regions, further expanding 
the powers of the military.  The effect is spaces of insecurity being produced: it is 
assumed that ‘ungoverned spaces’ are where threats emanate from (Hartmann, 
2010).  An imaginary of threat is created where ungoverned spaces are 
characterised by fragility, instability and conflict.  Unhelpfully, it “reproduce[s] 
stereotypes of an uncivilised and dangerous other” (Ide 2016: 68).  Moreover, 
actually reversing carbon emissions and changing tack in development processes 
become highly challenging.  This is because it maintains “an imperial framework 
here in the specification of peripheral dangers to a metropolitan civilization, one 
that is worrisome indeed for anyone concerned to think about security beyond 
the maintenance of the geopolitical status quo that has caused the problem in the 
first place” (Dalby, 2013b: 41). 
 
Here, climate security scholarship and environmental security studies more 
broadly are hampered by a salient analytical omission that does not afford a 
critical look into low carbon development. Despite the framing of the ‘South’ as 
violent or fragile, fragility is hard to define in concrete terms.  In their study, 
Vivekananda et al. (2014) focus on both formal and informal institutions that fail 
to serve citizens and community members in areas of security and basic service 
provision.  These institutions may lack the capacity or intention to uphold the 
rule of law for example.  While this definition has merit in including not only 
governments but also locale-specific informal institutions, the concept of fragility 
is nonetheless heavily criticised for its biased normative underpinnings in the 
development literature.  Nay (2014) offered a critique that the development and 
dissemination of fragility in global discourses is dominated by a Western 
interpretation of state-building that focuses on a permanent state with exclusive 
legitimacy to control its peoples and territory.  Consequently, biased standards 
of good governance are set.  Moreover, this notion furthers a donor-driven 
agenda that ultimately seeks to maintain an “international hegemony [that] is 
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tied to their capacity to maintain a Westphalian order based on stable and 
predictable transactions among central government” (Nay, 2014: 228).  
Discourses on climate security that seek to maintain sovereignty and 
international order have hitherto been effective (McDonald, 2013).  Coupling this 
discourse with the notion of fragility severely curtails the benefits of low carbon 
development for those in developing regions.   
 
The notion of ungoverned spaces holds deeply problematic and unfounded 
notion of a growing poor population who, for example, might end up as climate 
refugees threatening international security (Hartmann, 2010).  Development 
assistance is seen an antidote to abate escalation of conflict (ibid). The 
geopolitics of climate intervention is supported by what Chaturvedi and Doyle 
(2010: 220) call ‘imaginative geographies’ of fear and doom drawn up by 
“Northerncentric cartographic anxieties”. It thus ends up retaining the notion of 
impoverished regions and countries requiring assistance from industrialised 
economies.   
 
These geographical imaginaries also put in place deeply problematic 
assumptions that those in the global south are irresponsible and incapable of 
environmental problems (Ide 2016).  The effect is that the historical context of 
ecological degradation is obfuscated (Chaturvedi and Doyle, 2016). 
Such assumptions provide an easy excuse to couple with environmental 
determinism to portray a doomed fate of climate wars and insecurity riddled 
dystopia in places such as Africa (Verhoeven, 2014).  But this portrayal misses 
the fact that this narrative is also groomed by African elites with vested interests 
in continuing to receive international support and tighten their grip on political 
power.  The colonial narrative utilising environmental determinism are 
purposely reproduced in the postcolonial era such as in the case of Ethiopia so 
that “Ethiopian elites [profess] about the need for top-down development and 
tight political control, because ordinary famers cannot be trusted with the land 
or water” (Verhoeven 2014: 797).  Selby and Hoffman (2014: 362) point out that 
environmental scarcity/abundance is a “state-centric political imaginary” that 
obfuscates the causes on contention.  At the same time, this single-scale focus 
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overlooks the multi-scale political ecology of environmental problems. 
Consequently, states devise environmental policies, plans and governance 
mechanism that seemingly presents an orderly, cohesive approach within its 
territorial boundaries but ignores transboundary considerations (Ahlers et al., 
2014).  These points shed light on the fact that government mitigation and 
adaptation strategies such as green-grabbing may in fact be another form of 
state-building through which power is consolidated by elites (Camargo and 
Ojeda, 2017).   
 
The effects of low carbon development are embedded in decision-making 
processes of access and allocation of resources, distribution of benefits as well as 
burdens. These processes are layered with socio-economic, political, institutional 
and cultural factors and thus highly contextual.  Imaginaries of threats from 
violent, dangerous regions of the ‘South’ are not only simplistic notions but also 
those that conceal the political economy and political ecology that further 
entrench inequalities.   
 
5. Covert conflict over low carbon development 
Rebutting the application of ungoverned spaces requires a critical understanding 
of conflict. The notion of conflict is not well discussed in the climate security 
literature.  Acute, direct violence is often used as an indicator of conflict (see e.g. 
Scheffran et al., 2012). There are studies that highlight ‘hotspots’ or ‘risk areas’ 
that are likely to be at the intersection of climate and instability (Sherbinin, 
2014; Gemenne et al., 2014; Busby, 2017).  Organising understanding around 
maps of hotspots or risk areas enables policy-makers and practitioners to 
prioritise and justify efforts. However, problematically, the baselines of analysis 
are set by data collected through global or ‘northern’ datasets, leaving little room 
to meaningfully integrate locally derived, grounded data and knowledge 
(Sherbinin, 2014).  Recent studies also point to the English language bias to 
sample cases of climate and conflict, not only skewing our understanding but 
also potentially leading to maladaptive policy responses (Adams et al., 2018).    
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Moreover, as studies of resource allocation such as transboundary water have 
shown, conflict is —more often than not— non-violent and that these types of 
conflict perpetuate inequalities and unsustainable practices (Zeitoun and 
Warner, 2006).  If acute violence is an indicator for analysing conflict, then it 
becomes difficult to capture incidents of non-acute or indirect violence and to 
examine them in relationship to climate change. It has been argued that cases of 
transboundary water management are better understood as coexistence of 
conflictive and cooperative actions (Mirumachi, 2015).  This approach helps 
shed light on the power relationships, geopolitical drivers as well as the 
materiality of infrastructure that affect how actors engage with water resources 
management (ibid).  In addition, compliance to unequal arrangements is often 
manufactured such that power asymmetry is not easily questioned (Zeitoun et al. 
2011).  O’Lear (2016: 4) calls these non-acute effects of such compliance slow 
violence, or “indirect, latent, neglectful human suffering resulting from particular 
actions or decisions”.  If climate change is dealt in a way that depoliticises or 
universalises the discussion, then it benefits certain powerful groups of people 
and cause slow violence to others that is rendered as an inevitability (ibid). 
Understanding these forms of conflict and violence is particularly pertinent for 
low carbon development where unevenness of its effects is not only spatial but 
also temporal.  In other words, communities may experience the burdens and 
trade-offs not immediately and instead in the longer term.  For example, dams 
built as low carbon initiatives may cause incremental, latent changes to 
livelihoods that are not necessarily measured or monitored.  Consequently, 
grievances may not be easy to identify in pre-project impact assessments or even 
post-hoc.  Furthermore, in cases of slow violence, because suffering are 
purposely neglected grievances may be ignored when raised.   
 
Conflict can thus be both overt ---as apparent violence-- and covert—as coerced 
consent and compliance.  The causes of these are deeply associated with means 
of exerting political power to control access and allocation to resources (see e.g. 
Watts and Peet, 2004;  Zeitoun and Warner, 2006; Zeitoun et al., 2011).  Political 
expedience is one manifestation of the way power is utilised when low carbon 
developments are taken up in an opportunistic fashion.  For example, in 
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Pakistan, political elites have portrayed dams as the “best adaptation strategy”, 
implying environmental threats are being taken care of, but in fact, these water 
infrastructures are arguably worsening political fissures within and between 
Pakistan’s provinces (Ahkter, 2015: 745).  Dealing with flood disasters have also 
become part of political agendas of powerful Pakistani state actors: “the state 
addresses disasters (even) in conflict areas through the same processes of 
neoliberal marketisation, imperial expansion, and power and privilege that 
helped to create them in the first instance” (Siddiqi, 2018b: S164).  In this way, 
the discourse of adaptation can be used effectively to promote vested interests.  
Elites can mobilise large groups of citizens and engage in conflict that benefits 
them by intentionally exploiting local grievances related to resource access 
exacerbated by the impacts of climate change. Insights from the Sudans and 
Kenya demonstrate government and non-governmental armies/forces playing to 
long-standing grievances between groups for recruitment and support (van 
Baalen and Mobjörk, 2016). In these processes, conflict can be overt and covert 
but nevertheless reveal power relations between institutions and actors that 
have much to gain or to lose from new low carbon interventions. 
 
6. Marginalisation and dispossession   
Assessing the winners and losers of low carbon development is challenged 
especially when the state of knowledge on the effects of climate change and 
variability on violent conflict is yet to be determined (Adger et al., 2014). 
Deligiannis (2012: 84) called it the “black box [that] are specific impacts on 
people’s livelihoods of environmental scarcities and people’s adaptations to 
them”.  However, there are some hints to be gleaned.  For example, natural 
resource scarcities exacerbated by climate change are examined in their relation 
to insecurities, such as intensification of terrorist group activities, (e.g. 
Mwiturubani and van Wyk, 2010; International Conference of Defence Ministers 
and Senior Officials, 2015; GRO, 2014).  Studies like Adano et al. (2012:77) found 
that contrary to popular belief, in Kenya’s drylands “more conflicts and killings 
take place in wet season times of relative abundance, and less in dry season 
times of relative scarcity, when people reconcile their differences and 
cooperate”.  The authors demonstrated that the determinant of violence between 
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poor and marginalised ethnic groups was the absence of social and 
governmental institutions to mediate tensions during the wet seasons, not the 
changing environmental conditions.  These studies offer insight as to how the 
contentions around low carbon development has less to do with climate and 
more with pre-existing grievances, power struggles and practices of 
inclusion/exclusion in decision-making.   
 
In sub-Saharan Africa, it has been suggested that the core factor determining 
violent outcomes related to climate change is political marginalisation (Raleigh, 
2010) and those neglected communities blame and direct aggression to the 
government for climatic shocks (Detges, 2017).  Without addressing power, 
adaptation can particularly affect marginalised groups and communities (Taylor, 
2013).  Problematically, states are not always held accountable to adaptation 
efforts, which is compounded by problems of difficulty in defining and 
measuring adaptation (Hall and Persson, 2017).  In fact, dealing with climate 
change challenges state-society relationships such that the politics of climatic 
disasters defy generic processes through which outcomes of conflict can be 
associated (Siddiqi, 2014; 2018b).  Issues such as citizenship become critical in 
dealing with welfare after disasters, as Siddiqi’s (2018a) study of flooding in 
Pakistan showed.  Thus, addressing grievances against the state requires 
measures such as conferring rights in the form of citizenship. 
 
Low carbon development can exacerbate exclusion and marginalisation of 
specific communities and render them simply as ‘wasteful lives’ (Gidwani, 2003 
in Yenneti et al., 2016).  They are dispossessed of their livelihoods and resources 
redistributed “upwards to classes considered to be more capable (and therefore 
deserving)” (ibid: 97).  The example of the large-scale Chranka solar park in 
Gujarat, India crucially reveals coercive measures of capturing land from those 
least able to rebuke compulsory asset acquisition and those without alternatives 
livelihoods.  Such actions are made in the name of clean energy and progressive 
development.  By deeming agricultural or pastoral land ‘wasteful’ and solar 
energy production more valuable, the government agencies further entrench 
marginalisation (ibid).  Dispossession is not restricted to rural livelihoods and 
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extends to urban contexts such as that of municipal waste management in Mbale, 
Uganda (Silver 2018).  Waste turned into compost becomes a way to trade 
carbon credits and utilise the clean development mechanism.  Converting the 
waste dump into low carbon infrastructure has meant that those who relied on 
waste collection and picking had livelihood options denied.  These waste-pickers, 
already at the margins of society and struggling to meet their needs for food, 
housing and education, face socio-ecological violence arising from dealing with 
climate change that only worsens their precarious lives (ibid).  These examples 
hold pertinent lessons on the need to unveil effects of low carbon development 
in a critical light because dispossession and marginalisation do not ‘just happen’ 
and are purposefully enacted.  Otherwise, simply coping to the adverse effects 
becomes normalised for marginalised groups. 
 
7.  Resilience as a technology of governance 
Normalising the adverse effects of low carbon development can also be found in 
strategies of resilience.  Low carbon development can be framed as a means to 
address climate risks and to build in precautionary measures.  In these cases, low 
carbon development incorporates resilience based on the argument that climate 
change makes it impossible to maintain static conditions.  Thus, dealing with 
external shocks and changes are necessary and development can strengthen 
resilience (Corry, 2012).3  Resilience is enhanced by learning through which local 
agency is exercised (Schilling et al., 2017).   Resilience incorporates aspects of 
temporalities between past insecurities and future risks, highlighting complexity 
that cannot be dealt with simple technical fixes (ibid).    
 
However, while resilience implies possible positive action towards improving 
the capacity to cope, adapt or learn, there are shortcomings.   It has been 
reported that resilience may come at the expense of vulnerability at other spatial 
scales, as in the case of flooding in central Vietnam (Beckman, 2011).   In 
addition, there are arguments that resilience could depoliticise disasters such 
that they are presumed inevitable and require coping and surviving to them: 
structural causes of disasters are ignored.  Critical studies of resilience point out 
that concepts such as power need to be seriously engaged to avoid climate 
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interventions being depoliticised (Olsson et al., 2015).  The inevitability denies 
political agency of people to counter and change conditions to avoid disasters 
(Schilling et al., 2017). Mason (2014) provided incisive analysis on the 
implications of UN agencies pursuing a human security approach to climate 
insecurities particularly in post-conflict areas.  He contended that by taking a 
politically neutral stance in post-conflict situations, UN agencies have adopted 
techno-managerial measures to increase resilience against climate risks.  Focus 
transfers from the “social and ecological conditions of life to the bodily or 
corporeal vulnerability on individuals” (ibid: 812).  However, despite the 
intentions to address vulnerability, techno-managerial measures do not rectify 
the political conditions in which certain groups are marginalised or excluded in 
the first place from participating in and contributing to capacity building.  The 
‘neutral’ intervention aims to provide stability and order in a post-conflict 
context but in fact preserves the geopolitical conditions that give rise to social 
and ecological harm (ibid). By treating effects of climate change as inevitable, 
they are managed through contingent measures that emphasise preparedness 
and enhancing coping (Oels, 2013).  Low carbon development becomes an 
instrument of such contingency with depoliticising effects.    
 
Resilience may not be sufficient and instead entrench existing status quo and 
power relations (Pelling, 2011; Boas and Rothe, 2016).  Importantly, it has been 
suggested that resilience needs to be socialised so that interventions such as the 
introduction of rights address historically and institutionally perpetuated 
inequalities and exposure to risk and vulnerability (Ensor et al., 2018). 
Otherwise, as Duffield (2007) sharply pointed out, resilience only serves to keep 
those populations where they are, halting them from encroaching on the global 
north, further feeding into the geographical imaginaries of the global south as 
mentioned in section 4.  It is argued that the security concerns of these 
industrialised countries drive interventions: an intentional, purposeful set of 
actions that allow for “coercive measures to be applied on the unfit” under the 
guise of resilience (Bettini, 2014: 190). The perverse effects of using resilience as 
a technology of governance could be that low carbon development ends up 
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making ‘ungoverned spaces’ further ungovernable in reality and missing the 
mark on causes of harm.   
 
This point has implications for policy that position climate adaptation and 
development as part of an integrated agenda of resilience (e.g. above-mentioned 
G7 report).  The complex nature of climate risk means that development, 
humanitarian or peacebuilding efforts cannot take a siloed approach to deal with 
a particular effect of climate change.  It requires a more detailed look at 
improving structures for development and livelihoods (see Henly-Shepard et al., 
2018; Schilling et al., 2017).  At the same time, these inventions cannot 
inadvertently normalise coping to harm.  
   
Furthermore, there is much scope for scholarship on climate security to engage 
with ideas on the limitations of adaptation and resilience.  Adaptation limits 
highlight that depending on the actor, tolerance for risk can vary and be dynamic 
temporally (Dow et al., 2013).  Currently, the governance of adaptation is limited 
in addressing temporal changes of adaptive effects.  Moreover, the complex 
factors contributing to such effects cannot be captured in a simple evaluation of 
adaptation (Ford et al., 2013). After all, “adaptation to climate change has the 
potential to leave some people behind while others manage to steer their 
livelihoods towards a more ‘climate-proof’ future” (Mikulewicz, 2018: 21).  
These points could help crystalise inadvertent effects of low carbon 
interventions and specify the variegated pathways of insecurities depending on 
individuals and social groups. 
 
 
8. Furthering security analysis of low carbon development 
As we have argued above, the focus of climate security should not only be on the 
climatic events but also on the interventions to deal with climate change, 
whether for mitigation or adaptation. The five dimensions of security 
implications demonstrate the variegated impacts of low carbon development.  
Climate security thus does not manifest in a universal way across different 
populations and spatial scales.  How, when, for whom low carbon development is 
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an opportunity or a threat is socially constructed and deeply political.  A critical 
analysis of low carbon development presents an insight into the power relations 
between industrialised regions and ungoverned spaces.  Rather than equating 
this power asymmetry to a generic division between the global north and south, 
there are some promising lines of inquiry to further understand the way low 
carbon development is experienced.  
 
As argued, patterns of uneven development differ spatially.  In African countries, 
‘climate-resilient and low carbon development’ calls for strengthening existing 
policies and practices but also physically scale up for the provision of low carbon 
energy (World Bank, 2015).  Such emphasis on expanded infrastructure, whether 
it be in the form of hydropower dams, solar farms or geothermal facilities, will 
likely reconfigure space and change the flow of capital. The notion of 
territoriality by Bridge et al. (2013) can be a useful way to shed light on the ways 
social and political power is used to produce geographical differences in low 
carbon development.  By focusing on territoriality, analysis of climate security 
can be more attentive to the variety and role of actors.  Governments, military, 
paramilitary groups and companies can contribute to militarisation and 
marketisation of nature in the name of addressing climate change.  While the 
existing literature warns of dangers, the notion of climate change leading to 
conflict can become a self-fulfilling prophecy if the mechanisms that enable 
“enclosure, territorialisation, and market strategies of accumulation by 
dispossession” are left unchecked (Dunlap and Fairhead, 2014: 955).  Directing 
attention to spatiality and actors probes the distribution of power involved in 
managing ‘opportunities’ of low carbon development.  This angle of territoriality 
can complement existing studies that demonstrate how vulnerability is affected 
by intersecting axes of power and marginalisation.   
 
Another productive avenue of further research concerns the agency of climate 
security.  Many of the examples above showed the central role of the government 
in implementing low carbon development and thus bring up the question of how 
state and non-state agency work in polycentric governance of climate change 
(Jordan et al., 2018).  In a context where governments are looking to further 
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engage the private sector to achieve INDCs and Sustainable Development Goals, 
state and private sector relationships need to be further scrutinised.  Private 
sector actors routinely operate in so-called ‘fragile’ regions and often in natural 
resource sectors whilst trying to assess complex social conditions in which their 
business activities are embedded.  Low carbon infrastructure projects are often 
being implemented in developing countries but through businesses that are 
global and headquartered in the Global North.  This creates a situation where 
host governments have an impetus on attaining foreign direct investment and 
the government may end up being the purveyor of risk and vulnerability to its 
people. Policy debates have begun to call for conflict-sensitive business practices 
(International Alert, 2005, 2015; Graff and Iff, 2014). It is argued that such 
practice would minimize the impact of businesses on local conflict dynamics 
with a better grasp on environmental, social and political risks.  Examining 
conflict-sensitive practices can give better indications of private sector agency 
and its influence on government and local stakeholders and on the networks 
they establish with other actors.  However, analysis should not only extend to 
business practices but also to the vested interests shared between the state, 
private sector and any middle-men or intermediaries.  Power relationships need 
to be questioned so that conflict-sensitive practices allow for a better 
identification of stakeholder grievances.   
 
Finally, noting that challenges of marginalisation and coercive practices of low 
carbon development, climate security can better address the uneven effects of 
dealing with climate change through concepts of accountability.  Geographical 
and political economic studies on climate adaptation point to major structural 
problems of the capitalist system that continuously encourage resource 
extraction (e.g. Dalby, 2013a).  White (2014: 846) goes further to argue that the 
global neoliberal structure condones “policy and practice that assigns 
responsibility for welfare, employment, consumption and resource use to the 
individual, that views accountability through the lens of the market”.  The 
increased efforts at global governance of environmental issues mean that 
accountability mechanisms with a state-oriented focus will not be sufficient, 
given the range of non-state actors like global businesses and transnational civil 
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society networks (Biermann and Gupta, 2011).  Yet, accountability mechanisms 
of global governance may not be sufficient to grasp the political-economic 
dimensions of unevenness.  Spagnuolo (2011) argued that legal measures such 
as global administrative law may be more advantageous to those in the global 
north, transposing a hegemonic set of rules and norms to the global south.  
 
This is not to say that accountability mechanisms developed under a global 
governance framework are unsuitable.  New projects of low carbon development 
that have an impact on indigenous communities could be better guided by The 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN General 
Assembly, 2007).  Analysts can be better attuned to the practices of applying 
global norms and instruments to specific cases, such as Free Prior Informed 
Consent.  However, Dunlap (2017) argued that in Mexico, Free, Prior and 
Informed Consent for wind energy projects became a ‘bureaucratic trap’ which 
undermined indigenous autonomy, reinforced political and economic 
marginalisation and prioritised corporate interests.   Gupta and Mason (2016) 
cautioned that transparency as a means to provide accountability can be 
privatised, constraining disclosure in a way that would benefit private actors and 
their authority, as well as be technocratised, narrowing focus to the design of 
accountability systems with less regard to their purpose.  They argued that if 
information of risks is treated as private goods, then exercising the right to know, 
participation and making informed choices would be more difficult or 
exclusionary for some actors.  Hence, it is worth critically examining these 
accountability measures for potential problems and bias in its application. 
Accountability mechanisms themselves may be part of the problem of 
unevenness. 
 
9. Conclusion  
The paper questioned how, when and for whom climate change matters when 
mitigation and adaptation measures sometimes inadvertently, at times 
intentionally, contribute to insecurity.   By focusing on low carbon developments, 
five problematic security implications were considered:  uneven low carbon 
development; violent imaginaries and production of ‘ungoverned spaces’; non-
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violent, covert conflict; marginalisation and dispossession; and depoliticising 
effects of resilience.  Clearly, low carbon development is not value neutral or 
with benefits only.  Undesirable, perverse and unexpected effects exist and could 
further deepen conditions of insecurity.  By positioning low carbon development 
as deeply political, the paper offered new insights on the way climate security 
issues not only manifest but also are socially constructed and produced.  
Examining low carbon development raises questions about ungoverned spaces 
and where they lay.  More importantly, it sheds light on the various mechanisms 
that attempt to contain such spaces. Particular scrutiny is needed on power 
structures embedded in any local context in which specific mitigation or 
adaptation projects are implemented.   
 
As efforts to implement INDCs accelerate, policy will need to carefully highlight 
the implications of this course of action.  The weak and contested evidence base 
on the impacts and implications of dealing with climate change leads to 
piecemeal and inconsistent policy uptake of findings (Peters and Vivekanada, 
2014; Lewis and Lenton, 2015; Scheffran et al., 2014).   Further systematic 
examination of security implications is needed as well as widening the analytical 
scope on climate security as we have argued.  It has been suggested that a 
strategic narrative could help build buy-in to act on concerns of climate change 
from the public and other stakeholders (Bushell et al., 2015).  A strategic 
narrative from a refreshed perspective of climate security could point to the 
risks and opportunities of low carbon development.  Furthering climate security 
in this regard helps point out the problematic assumptions and potential blind 
spots in understanding inequalities of low carbon development.  Refined climate 
security analysis could hold promise for challenging and changing the very 
structures and conditions in which low carbon development occur.   
  
                                                        
1 Swatuk et al. (2018) point out that these impacts are possible to anticipate but 
nevertheless left unaddressed. 
2 Specific types of climate engineering cut across mitigation and adaptation, as 
classified by Boucher et al., 2013 
3 The UK government, which first discussed climate security as an international 
agenda, has shifted its policy to take up the language of resilience in a major way 
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to aid developing countries and to foster international cooperation (e.g. UK 
government, 2018).   
 26 
 
 27 
References 
Adams, C., Ide, T., Barnett, J., & Detges, A. (2018). Sampling bias in climate-
conflict research. Nature Climate Change, 8(3), 200-203. doi: 
10.1038/s41558-018-0068-2 
Adano, W.R. , Dietz, T. , Witsenburg, K., & Zaal, F.  (2012). Climate change, violent 
conflict and local institutions in Kenya’s drylands. Journal of Peace Research, 
49 (1), 65-80, 2012. doi: 10.1177/0022343311427344 
 
Adger, W.N., Pulhin, J.M., Barnett, J., Dabelko, G.D., Hovelsrud, G.K., Levy, M., 
Oswald Spring, Ú.,  & Vogel, C.H. (2014). Human security. In C.B. Field et al. 
(Eds.), Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: 
Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (pp. 
755-791). Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, USA.  
 
Ahlers, R., Brandimarte, L., Kleemans, I., & Sadat, S.H. (2014). Ambitious 
development on fragile foundations: Criticalities of current large dam 
construction in Afghanistan. Geoforum, 54, 49-58. doi: 
10.1016/j.geoforum.2014.03.004 
 
Akhter, M. (2015). Dams as a Climate Change Adaptation Strategy: Geopolitical 
Implications for Pakistan. Strategic Analysis, 39(96), 744-748. doi: 
10.1080/09700161.2015.1090680 
 
Anderson , C. A. & DeLisi , M. (2015). Implications of global climate change for 
violence in developed and developing countries. In J. Forgas, A. Kruglanski, & 
K. Williams (Eds.), Social conflict and aggression (pp 249- 265). New York, 
NY : Psychology Press. 
Ayers, J., Huq, S., Wright, H., Faisal, A. M., & Hussain, S. T. (2014). Mainstreaming 
climate change adaptation into development in Bangladesh. Climate and 
Development, 6(4), 293-305. doi: 10.1080/17565529.2014.977761 
 28 
Barnett, J.  & Adger, N. (2007). Climate change, human security and violent 
conflict. Political Geography, 26(6), 639-655. 
Beckett, M. (2006). Margaret Beckett – 2006 speech in Berlin. Retrieved from 
www.ukpol.co.uk/margaret-beckett-2006-speech-in-berlin/  
Beckett, M. (2007). The case for climate security. The RUSI Journal, 152(3), 54-59. 
doi: 10.1080/03071840701470582 
Beckman, M. (2011). Converging and conflicting interests in adaptation to 
environmental change in central Vietnam. Climate and Development, 3(1), 
32-41. doi: 10.3763/cdev.2010.0065 
Bettini, G. (2014). Climate migration as an adaptation strategy: De-securitizing 
climate-induced migration or making the unruly governable?  Critical Studies 
on Security, 2(2), 180-195. doi: 10.1080/21624887.2014.909225 
Biermann, F. & Gupta, A. (2011). Accountability and legitimacy in earth system 
governance: A research framework. Ecological Economics, 70(11), 1856-
1864. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2011.04.008 
Blaikie, P., Cannon, T. , Davis, I.,  & Wisner, B. (2004). At risk: natural hazards, 
people’s vulnerability and disasters. 2nd edition. London & New York: 
Routledge. 
Boas, I., & Rothe, D. (2016). From conflict to resilience? explaining recent 
changes in climate security discourse and practice. Environmental 
Politics, 25(4), 613-632. doi: 10.1080/09644016.2016.1160479 
Boucher, O., Forster, P.M., Gruber, N., Ha-Doung, M., Lawarence, M.G., Lenton, 
T.M., Maas, A. & Vaughan, N.E. (2013). Rethinking climate engineering 
categorization in the context of climate change mitigation and adaptation. 
WIREs Climate Change. doi: 10.1002/wcc.261 
Bowen, A., & Fankhauser, S. (2011). Low-carbon development for least developed 
countries. Oxfam discussion papers. Oxford: Oxfam GB. 
Boyd, E. (2002). The Noel Kempff project in Bolivia: Gender, power, and 
decision-making in climate mitigation. Gender & Development, 10(2), 70-77. 
doi: 10.1080/13552070215905 
 29 
Boyd, E., Grist, N., Juhola, S., & Nelson, V. (2009). Exploring development futures 
in a changing climate: Frontiers for development policy and 
practice. Development Policy Review, 27(6), 659-674. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
7679.2009.00464.x 
Bridge, G., Bouzarovski, S., Bradshaw, M., & Eyre, N. (2013). Geographies of 
energy transition: Space, place and the low-carbon economy. Energy Policy 
53, 331–340. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2012.10.066 
Brock, L. (1997). The environment and security: Conceptual and theoretical 
issues. In Gleditsch, N. P. (Ed.), Conflict and the environment (pp.17-34). 
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Brooks, N., Grist, N., & Brown, K. (2009). Development futures in the context of 
climate change: Challenging the present and learning from the 
past. Development Policy Review, 27(6), 741-765. 
Brzoska, M. (2009). The securitization of climate change and the power of 
conceptions of security. Security & Peace, 27, 137-145. doi: 10.5771/0175-
274x-2009-3-137 
Brzoska, M. (2018). Weather extremes, disasters and collective violence: 
Conditions, mechanisms and disaster-related policies in recent research. 
Current Climate Change Reports, 4, 320-329. doi: 10.1007/s40641-018-
0117-y 
Buhaug, H., Nordkvelle, J., Bernauer, T., Böhmelt, T., Brzoska, M., Busby, J.W., 
Ciccone, A., Fjelde, H., Gartzke, E., Gleditsch, N.P., Goldstone, J.A., Hegre, H., 
Holtermann, H., Koubi, V., Link, J.S.A., Link, P.M., Lujala, P., O’Loughlin, J., 
Raleigh, C., Scheffran, J., Schilling, J., Smith, T.G., Theisen, O.M., Tol, R.S.J., 
Urdal, H., & von Uexkull, N. (2014).  One effect to rule them all? A comment 
on climate and conflict, Climatic Change, 127(3): 391-397. doi: 
10.1007/s10584-014-1266-1 
Buhaug, H., Benjaminsen, T.A., Sjaastad, E. & Theisen, O.M. (2015). Climate 
variability, food production shocks, and violent conflict in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Environmental Research Letters, 10: 125015 
 30 
Busby, J. (2017). Mapping epicenters of climate and security vulnerabilities. In C. 
E. Werrell, & F. Femia (Eds.), Epicenters of climate and security: the new 
geostrategic landscape of the anthropocene (pp. 122-131). The Centre for 
Climate & Security. Retrieved from 
https://climateandsecurity.org/epicenters/ 
Bushell, S., Colley, T.P., & Workman, M. 2015. A Unified Narrative for Climate 
Change. Nature climate change, 5, 971-973. doi: 10.1038/nclimate2726 
Chaturvedi, S., & Doyle, T. (2016). Climate terror: A critical geopolitics of climate 
change. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Chaturvedi, S., & Doyle, T. (2010). Geopolitics of fear and the emergence of 
‘climate refugees’: Imaginative geographies of climate change and 
displacements in Bangladesh. Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, 6(2), 206-
222. doi: 10.1080/19480881.2010.536665 
Clapp, C., Briner, G. & Karousakis, K. (2010). Low-emission development 
strategies (LEDS): Technical, institutional and policy lessons. Paris: 
OECD/IEA. 
CNA. (2007). National security and the threat of climate change. Alexandria, VA: 
CNA Corporation. 
CNA Military Advisory Board. (2014). National security and the accelerating risks 
of climate change. Alexandria, VA: CNA Corporation. 
Coirolo, C., & Rahman, A. (2014). Power and differential climate change 
vulnerability among extremely poor people in northwest Bangladesh: 
Lessons for mainstreaming. Climate and Development, 6(4), 336-344. doi: 
10.1080/17565529.2014.934774 
Corry, O. (2014). From defense to resilience: Environmental security beyond 
neo-liberalism. International Political Sociology, 8(3), 256-274. doi: 
10.1111/ips.12057; 18 
Dalby, S. (2013a). Biopolitics and climate security in the Anthropocene, 
Geoforum, 49: 184-192.  doi: 10.1016/j.geoforum.2013.06.013 
Dalby, S. (2013b). The geopolitics of climate change, Political Geography, 37: 38-
47. doi: 10.1016/j.polgeo.2013.09.004 
 31 
D’Alisaa, G. and Kallis, G. (2016). A political ecology of maladaptation: Insights 
from a Gramscian theory of the State. Global Environmental Change 38, 230–
242. doi: 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2016.03.006 
Deligiannis, T. (2012). The evolution of environment-conflict research: Toward a 
livelihood framework. Global Environmental Politics, 12(1), 78-100. doi: 
10.1162/GLEP_a_00098; 18 
Dellmuth, L. M., Gustafsson, M., Bremberg, N., & Mobjörk, M. (2018). 
Intergovernmental organizations and climate security: Advancing the 
research agenda. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 9(1), e496. 
doi: 10.1002/wcc.496; 18 
Department of Defence. (2010). Quadrennial defense review 2010. Washington, 
DC: Department of Defence. 
Department of Defence. (2014). Quadrennial defense review 2014. Washington, 
DC: Department of Defence. 
Detges, A. (2017). Droughts, state-citizen relations and support for political 
violence in Sub-Saharan Africa: A micro-level analysis. Political Geography 
61, Supplement C, 88-98. doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2017.07.005 
Diez, T., von Lucke, F., & Wellmann, Z. (2016). The securitisation of climate 
change: Actors, processes and consequences. Abingdon, New York: Routledge. 
Dow, K., Berkhout, F., & Preston, B. L. (2013). Limits to adaptation to climate 
change: A risk approach. Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability, 5 
(3), 384-391.  doi:10.1016/j.cosust.2013.07.005 
Duffield, M. (2007). Development, security and unending war: Governing the world 
of peoples. Cambridge and Malden, MA: Polity. 
Dunlap, A. (2017). “A bureaucratic trap:” free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) 
and wind energy development in Juchitán, Mexico. Capitalism Nature 
Socialism, 1-21. doi: 10.1080/10455752.2017.1334219 
 32 
Dunlap, A.,  & Fairhead, J. (2014). The Militarisation and Marketisation of Nature: 
An Alternative Lens to ‘Climate-Conflict’. Geopolitics, 19(4), 937-961. doi: 
10.1080/14650045.2014.964864 
Ensor, J., Forrester, J., & Matin, N. (2018). Bringing rights into resilience: 
Revealing complexities of climate risks and social conflict. Disasters, 42, 
S287-S305. doi: 10.1111/disa.12304; 22 
Eriksen, S., Aladunce, P., Bahinipati, C. S., Martins, R. D., Molefe, J. I., Nhemachena, 
C., et al. (2011). When not every response to climate change is a good one: 
Identifying principles for sustainable adaptation. Climate and Development, 
3(1), 7-20. doi: 10.3763/cdev.2010.0060 
Ficklin, L., Stringer, L. C., Dougill, A. J., & Sallu, S. M. (2018). Climate compatible 
development reconsidered: Calling for a critical perspective. Climate and 
Development, 10(3), 193-196. doi: 10.1080/17565529.2017.1372260 
Fingar, T. (2008). Statement for the record of Dr. Thomas finger, deputy director of 
national intelligence for analysis and chairman of the national intelligence 
council: Before the permanent select committee on intelligence and the select 
committee on energy independence and global warming; house of 
representatives. Washington, DC: U.S. Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence. 
Fjelde, H. (2015). Farming or Fighting? Agricultural Price Shocks and Civil War in 
Africa. World Development, 67, 525-534. 
doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.10.032 
 
Floyd, R., & Matthew, R.A. (2013). Environmental Security Studies: An 
Introduction. In R. Floyd& R.A. Matthew (Eds.) Environmental Security: 
Approaches and Issues (pp. 1-20). Abingdon and New York: Routledge. 
Ford, J. D., Berrang-Ford, L., Lesnikowski, A., Barrera, M., & Heymann, S. J. (2013). 
How to track adaptation to climate change: A typology of approaches for 
national-level application. Ecology and Society, 18(3).  doi: 10.5751/ES-
05732-180340 
 33 
Funder, M., JFjalland, J., Ravnborg, H.M., & Egelyng, H. (2009). Low Carbon 
Development and Poverty Alleviation: Options for Development Cooperation 
in Energy, Agriculture and Forestry. DIIS REPORT 2009:20. Copenhagen: 
Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS. 
Gemenne, F. , Barnett, J. , Adger, N., &Dabelko G. (2014). Climate and Security: 
Evidence, Emerging Risks, and a New Agenda. Climatic Change, 123(1), 1-9. 
doi: 10.1007/s10584-014-1074-7 
Gilbert, E. (2012). The militarization of climate change. ACME: An International 
Journal for Critical Geographies, 11(1), 1-14. 
Gleick, P.H. (2017). Climate, water, and conflict: Commentary on Selby et al. 
2017. Political Geography, 60, Supplement C, 248-250 
Goulden, M., & Few, R. (2011). Climate Change, Water and Conflict in the Niger 
Basin. London and Norwich: International Alert and University of East 
Anglia. 
Graff, A., & Iff, A. (2014). Conflict-Sensitive Business Practices: Review of 
Instruments and Guidelines. Bern: Swisspeace. 
Grove, K. J. (2010). Insuring “Our common future?” dangerous climate change 
and the biopolitics of environmental security. Geopolitics, 15(3), 536-563. 
doi: 10.1080/14650040903501070 
GRO (2014). Climate change, resource scarcity & conflict. Cambridge: GRO. 
 
Gupta, A., & Mason, M. (2016). Disclosing or obscuring? The politics of 
transparency in global climate governance. Current Opinion in Environmental 
Sustainability, 18, Supplement C: 82-90. doi: 10.1016/j.cosust.2015.11.004 
 
Guterres, A. (2017). Calling Climate Change Direct Threat, Multiplier of Many 
Others at General Assembly Event, Secretary-General Stresses Need for 
Urgent, Decisive Action. Press Release SG/SM/18470-GA/11899-
ENV/DEV/1778. United Nations, Geneva. 
 34 
Haldén, P. (2007). The geopolitics of climate change: Challenges to the 
international system. Stockholm: FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency. 
Hall, N., & Persson, Å. (2017). Global climate adaptation governance: Why is it 
not legally binding? European Journal of International Relations, 1–27. doi: 
10.1177/1354066117725157 
Hartmann, B. (2010). Rethinking climate refugees and climate conflict: Rhetoric, 
reality and the politics of policy discourse. Journal of International 
Development, 22(2), 233-246. doi: 10.1002/jid.1676; 18 
Hendrix, C.S. (2017). A comment on “Climate change and the Syrian civil war 
revisited”. Political Geography, 60, Supplement C, 251-252 
 
Hendrix, C.S., & Salehyan, I. (2012). Climate change, rainfall, and social conflict in 
Africa. Journal of Peace Research 49(1), 35–50. doi: 
10.1177/0022343311426165 
Henly-Shepard, S., Zommers, Z., Levine, E., & Abrahams, D. (2018). Climate 
resilient development in fragile contexts. In Z. Zommers, & K. Alverson 
(Eds.), Resilience: The science of adaptation to climate change (pp. 279-291). 
Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Homer-Dixon, T. (1999). Environment, Scarcity, and Violence. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press 
 
Hsiang, S.M.. & Burke, M.  (2014).  Climate, conflict, and social stability: what 
does the evidence say? Climatic Change, 123(1), 39–55. doi: 
10.1007/s10584-013-0868-3 
 
Hsiang, S. M.,  Burke, M., & Miguel, E. (2013). Quantifying the influence of climate 
on human conflict. Science, 341(6151), 1-17. doi: 10.1126/science.1235367 
Ide, T. & Scheffran, J. (2014). On climate, conflict and cumulation: Suggestions for 
integrative cumulation of knowledge in the research on climate change and 
 35 
violent conflict. Global Change, Peace & Security, 26, 263-279. doi: 
10.1080/14781158.2014.924917 
Ide, T. (2016). Critical geopolitics and school textbooks: The case of 
environment-conflict links in Germany. Political Geography, 55, 60-71. doi: 
10.1016/j.polgeo.2016.07.002 
Ide, T. (2017). Research methods for exploring the links between climate change 
and conflict.  WIREs Climate Change, 8, e456: 1-14. doi: 10.1002/wcc.456 
 
International Alert (2005). Conflict-sensitive business practice: Guidance for 
extractive industries. London: International Alert.  
 
International Alert (2015). Peace through prosperity: Incorporating 
Peacebuilding into economic development.  London: International Alert 
 
International conference of defence ministers and senior officials (2015). The 
Implications of Climate Change for Defence 2015. Paris: International 
conference of defence ministers and senior officials 
 
IPCC (2012). Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance 
Climate Change Adaptation. A Special Report of Working Groups I and II of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
IPCC (2014). Climate Change 2014 – Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability: Part 
A: Global and Sectoral Aspects: Working Group II Contribution to the IPCC 
Fifth Assessment Report. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
IPCC (2018). GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5 °C: an IPCC special report on the impacts 
of global warming of 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels and related global 
greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the 
global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, 
and efforts to eradicate poverty. Retrieved from 
http://www.ipcc.ch/report/sr15/ 
 36 
 
Jones, B.T., Mattiacci, E., & Braumoeller, B.F. (2017). Food scarcity and state 
vulnerability: Unpacking the link between climate variability and violent 
unrest.  Journal of Peace Research, 54(3), 335–350. doi: 
10.1177/0022343316684662 
Jordan, A., Huitema., D., Schoenefeld, J., van Asselt, H., & Forster. (2018). 
Governing climate change polycentrically: Setting the Scene. In A. Jordan, D. 
Huitema, H. van Asselt & J. Forster (Eds.) Governing Climate Change: 
Polycentricity in Action? (pp 3-25). Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Kelley C.P., Mohtadi S., Cane M.A., Seager R., & Kushnir, Y. (2015). Climate change 
in the Fertile Crescent and implications of the recent Syrian drought. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 112 (11), 3241-3246. doi: 
10.1073/pnas.1421533112 
 
Kelley, C., Mohtadi, S., Cane, M.A., Seager, R., & Kushnir, Y. (2017). Commentary 
on the Syria case: Climate as a contributing factor. Political Geography, 60, 
Supplement C, 245-247 
 
Kurtz, J., & McMahon, K. (2015). Pathways from Peace to Resilience: Evidence 
from the Greater Horn of Africa on the Links between Conflict Management 
and Resilience to Food Security Shocks. Washington, DC: Mercy Corps.  
 
Lewis, K. & Lenton, T. (2015).  Knowledge problems in climate change and 
security research. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 6(4), 383-
399. doi: 10.1002/wcc.346 
 
Maas, A. & Scheffran, J. (2012). Climate conflicts 2.0? Climate engineering as a 
challenge for international peace and security.  Security & Peace, 30(4), 193-
200. 
Magnan, A. K., Schipper, E. L. F., Burkett, M., Bharwani, S., Burton, I., Eriksen, S., 
Gemenne, F., Schaar, J. & Ziervogel, G. (2016). Addressing the risk of 
 37 
maladaptation to climate change. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate 
Change, 7(5), 646-665. doi: 10.1002/wcc.409; 25 
Marino, E. & Ribot, J. (2012).  Special Issue Introduction: Adding insult to injury: 
Climate change and the inequities of climate intervention.  Global 
Environmental Change, 22, 323–328. doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2012.03.001 
Mason, M. (2014). Climate Insecurity in (Post)Conflict Areas: The Biopolitics of 
United Nations Vulnerability Assessments. Geopolitics, 19(4), 806-828. doi: 
10.1080/14650045.2014.903393 
Mason, M., Zeitoun, M., & El Sheikh, R. (2011). Conflict and social vulnerability to 
climate change: Lessons from Gaza. Climate and Development, 3(4), 285-297. 
doi: 10.1080/17565529.2011.618386 
McDonald, M. (2013). Discourses of climate security. Political Geography, 33, 
Supplement C, 42-51 
 
McEwan, C. (2017). Spatial processes and politics of renewable energy 
transition: Land, zones and frictions in South Africa.  Political Geography, 56, 
1-12 
Mikulewicz, M. (2018). Politicizing vulnerability and adaptation: On the need to 
democratize local responses to climate impacts in developing 
countries. Climate and Development, 10(1), 18-34. doi: 
10.1080/17565529.2017.1304887 
Mirumachi, N. 2015. Transboundary Water Politics in the Developing World. 
Abingdon: Routledge. 
Mobjörk, M., Gustafsson, M., Sonnsjö, H., van Baalen, S., Dellmuth, L.S. & 
Bremberg, N. (2016). Climate-related security risks: Towards and Integrated 
Approach. Stockholm: SIPRI. 
Mulugetta, Y., & Urban, F. (2010). Deliberating on low carbon development. 
Energy Policy, 38(12), 7546-7549.  doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2010.05.049 
 38 
Mwiturubani, D., & van Wyk, J. (2010). Climate Change and Natural Resources 
Conflicts in Africa.  Nairobi: Institute for Security Studies.  
 
Natalini, D. , Jones, A.W., & Bravo, G. (2015). Quantitative Assessment of Political 
Fragility Indices and Food Prices as Indicators of Food Riots in Countries. 
Sustainability, 7, 4360-4385. 2015. doi: 10.3390/su7044360 
 
Nay, O. (2014). International Organisations and the Production of Hegemonic 
Knowledge: How the World Bank and the OECD helped invent the Fragile 
State Concept. Third World Quarterly, 35(2), 210-231. doi: 
10.1080/01436597.2014.878128 
 
Newell, P. & Bumpus, A. (2012). The Global Political Ecology of the Clean 
Development Mechanism. Global Environmental Politics, 12 (4), 49-67.  
OECD (2017).  Investing in Climate, Investing in Growth. Paris: OECD Publishing. 
Oels, A., (2013). Rendering climate change governable by risk: From probability 
to contingency. Geoforum, 45, 17-29. doi: 10.1016/j.geoforum.2011.09.007 
Okpara, U. T., Stringer, L. C., Dougill, A. J., & Bila, M. D. (2015). Conflicts about 
water in lake chad: Are environmental, vulnerability and security issues 
linked? Progress in Development Studies, 15(4), 308-325. doi: 
10.1177/1464993415592738; 18 
O’Lear, S. (2016). Climate science and slow violence: A view from political 
geography and STS on mobilizing technoscientific ontologies of climate 
change. Political Geography, 52, 4–13. doi: 10.1016/j.polgeo.2015.01.004 
Olsson, L., Jerneck, A., Thoren, H., Persson, J., & O’Byrne, D. (2015). Why 
resilience is unappealing to social science: Theoretical and empirical 
investigations of the scientific use of resilience. Science Advances, 1(4) 
doi:10.1126/sciadv.1400217 
Pelling, M. (2011). Adaptation to climate change: From resilience to 
transformation. London: Routledge. 
 39 
Peters, K. (2018). Disasters, climate change, and securitisation: The United 
Nnations security council and the United Kingdom's security 
policy. Disasters, 42, S196-S214. doi: 10.1111/disa.12307; 22 
Peters K., & Vivekanada, J. (2014). Topic Guide: Conflict, Climate and 
Environment, DFID: Evidence on Demand. London: DFID. 
 
Raleigh, C. (2010). Political marginalization, climate change and conflict in 
African Sahel states. International Studies Review, 12, 69-86.  doi: 
10.1111/j.1468-2486.2009.00913.x 
 
Rüttinger, L. , Smith, D., Stang, G., Tänzler, D., & Vivekananda, J. (2015). A New 
Climate for Peace: Taking Action on Climate and Fragility Risks. Berlin, 
London, Washington D.C., Paris: adelphi, International Alert, Woodrow 
Wilson International Center for Scholars, European Union Institute for 
Security Studies.  
 
Salehyan, I. (2008). From Climate Change to Conflict? No Consensus Yet. Journal 
of Peace Research, 45(3), 315–326. doi: 10.1177/0022343308088812 
 
Salehyan, I. (2014). Climate Change and Conflict: Making Sense of Disparate 
Findings, Political Geography, 43, 1-5. doi: 10.1016/j.polgeo.2014.10.004 
 
Selby, J., Dahi, O.S., Fröhlich, C. & Hulme, M. (2017). Climate change and the 
Syrian civil war revisited. Political Geography, 60, Supplement C, 232-244 
 
Scheffran, J., Brzoska, M., Kominek, J., Link, P.M., Schilling, J. (2012). Distangling 
the climate-conflict nexus: Empirical and theoretical assessment of 
vulnerabilities and pathways. Review of European Studies, 4(5), 1-13. 
doi:10.5539/res.v4n5p1 
Scheffran, J., Ide, T., & Schilling, J. (2014). Violent Climate or Climate of Violence? 
Concepts and Relations with Focus on Kenya and Uganda. The International 
 40 
Journal of Human Rights, 18(3), 369-90. doi: 
10.1080/13642987.2014.914722 
Schilling, J., Nash, S. L., Ide, T., Scheffran, J., Froese, R., & von Prondzinski, P. 
(2017). Resilience and environmental security: Towards joint application in 
peacebuilding. Global Change, Peace & Security, 29(2), 107-127. doi: 
10.1080/14781158.2017.1305347 
Shah, K. (2009).  The Failure of State Building and the Promise of State 
Failure: reinterpreting the security–development nexus in Haiti. Third World 
Quarterly, 30(1), 17-34. doi: 10.1080/01436590802622243 
 
Shah, K. (2014). The security-development nexus and fragile states: A critical 
political analysis. In H. Weber (Eds.) Politics of development: A survey (pp 
120-140). Abingdon: Routledge.  
 
Sherbinin, A. (2014). Climate change hotspots mapping: What have we learned? 
Climatic Change,  123, 23–37. doi: 10.1007/s10584-013-0900-7 
Siddiqi, A. (2014). Climatic disasters and radical politics in southern Pakistan: 
The non-linear connection. Geopolitics, 19(4), 885-910. doi: 
10.1111/disa.12302; 22 
Siddiqi, A. (2018a). ‘Disaster citizenship’: An emerging framework for 
understanding the depth of digital citizenship in Pakistan. Contemporary 
South Asia, 26(2), 157-174.  doi: 10.1080/09584935.2017.1407294 
Siddiqi, A. (2018b). Disasters in conflict areas: Finding the politics. Disasters, 42, 
S161-S172. doi: 10.1080/14650045.2014.920328 
Silver, J. (2018). Suffocating Cities: Urban Political Ecology and Climate Change as 
Social-Ecological Violence.  In H. Ernstson and E. Swyngedouw (eds). Urban 
Political Ecology in the Anthropo-Obscene: Interruptions and Possibilities.  
London: Routledge 
Snorek, J., Renaud, F.G., & Kloos, J.  (2014). Divergent adaptation to climate 
variability: A case study of pastoral and agricultural societies in Niger.  
 41 
Global Environmental Change, 29, 371–386. doi: 
10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2014.06.014 
 
Spagnuolo, F. (2011). Diversity and pluralism in earth system governance: 
Contemplating the role for global administrative law. Ecological Economics, 
70 (11), 1875-1881. doi: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2011.01.024 
Stripple, J. (2017). Environmental security: Policy within a violent imaginary. In J. 
Meadowcroft, & D. Fiorino (Eds.), Conceptual innovation in environmental 
policy (pp. 259-280). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Swatuk, L., Wirkus, L., Krampe, F., Thomas, B. Y., & Da Silva, L. P. B. (2018). The 
boomerang effect: Overview and implications for climate governance. In L. 
Swatuk, & L. Wirkus (Eds.), Water, climate change and the boomerang effect: 
Unintentional consequences for resource insecurity . Abingdon: Routledge. 
Taylor, M. (2013). Climate change, relational vulnerability and human security: 
Rethinking sustainable adaptation in agrarian environments. Climate and 
Development, 5(4), 318-327. doi: 10.1080/17565529.2013.830954 
Trombetta, M. J. (2008). Environmental security and climate change: Analysing 
the discourse. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 21(4), 585-602. doi: 
10.1080/09557570802452920 
Tänzler, D., Maas, A., & Carius, A. (2010). Climate change adaptation and 
peace. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 1(5), 741-750. doi: 
10.1002/wcc.66; 18 
UK Government (2018). UK expertise to help developing countries tackle 
climate change and move to cleaner energy. Press Release 27 September 2018. 
Retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-expertise-to-
help-developing-countries-tackle-climate-change-and-move-to-cleaner-
energy 
 
UN General Assembly (2007). United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, 2 
October 2007, A/RES/61/295 
 
 42 
UNEP (2011). Livelihood Security: Climate Change, Migration and Conflict in the 
Sahel. Geneva: UNEP 
Urban, F. (2010). The MDGs and beyond: Can low carbon development be pro-
poor? IDS Bulletin Volume, 41(1), 92-99. 
Verhoeven, H. (2014). Gardens of Eden or hearts of darkness? The genealogy of 
discourses on environmental insecurity and climate wars in Africa.  
Geopolitics, 19, 784-805. doi: 10.1080/14650045.2014.896794 
van Baalen, S., & Mobjörk, M. (2016) A coming anarchy? Pathways from climate 
change to violent conflict in East Africa. Stockholm: SIPRI & Stockholm 
University. 
 
Vivekananda, J. (2011). Conflict-sensitive responses to climate change in South 
Asia. London: International Alert.  
 
Vivekananda, J., Schilling, J., & Smith, D. (2014). Climate resilience in fragile and 
conflict-affected societies: concepts and approaches. Development in 
Practice, 24(4), 487-501 
Watts, M. & Peet, R. (2004). Liberating political ecology.  In, R. Peets & M. Watts 
(eds). Liberation Ecologies: Environment, Development and Social Movements 
(pp. 3-43). London: Routledge. 
Weir, T., & Virani, Z. (2011). Three linked risks for development in the pacific 
islands: Climate change, disasters and conflict. Climate and 
Development, 3(3), 193-208. doi: 10.1080/17565529.2011.603193 
The White House (2015). Findings from select federal reports: The national 
security implications of a changing climate.  Washington D.C. The White 
House. 
 
Walter, B. F. (2010). Conflict relapse and the sustainability of post-conflict peace. 
World Development Report background papers 2011. Washington, DC: 
World Bank. 
 43 
 
White, R. (2014). Environmental insecurity and fortress mentality. International 
Affairs, 90(4), 835–851. doi: 10.1111/1468-2346.12143 
Young, H., Behnke, R., Sulieman, H., Robinson, S., & Mohamed, A. (2016). Risk, 
resilience, and pastoralist mobility. Somerville, MA: Feinstein International 
Center. 
Zeitoun, M., & Warner, J. (2006). Hydro-hegemony – a framework for analysis of 
trans-boundary water conflicts.  Water Policy, 8, 435–460 
 
Zeitoun, M., Mirumachi, N., & Warner, J. (2011). Transboundary water interaction 
II: The influence of ‘soft’ power. International Environmental Agreements: 
Politics, Law and Economics, 11(2), 159-178. doi: 10.1007/s10784-010-
9134-6 
 
Zografos, C., Goulden, M. & Kallis, G. (2014). Sources of human insecurity in the 
face of hydro-climatic change.  Global Environmental Change, 29, 327–336. 
doi: 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2013.11.002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
